Abstract: Several regulatory authorities have recently allowed competing network operators to co-invest in network infrastructure. With the use of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the impact of co-investments on competition in regulated network industries, particularly in comparison to unilateral and duplicate investments. Our main finding is that co-investment (i.e. cooperation at the infrastructure level) facilitates tacit collusion (i.e. cooperation at the retail level) significantly, which questions the positive evaluation of co-investments with respect to consumers' surplus in the theoretical literature.
Introduction
The widespread availability of network infrastructure (e.g. electricity, water, broadband) is associated with economic well-being and growth, but it is also associated with large, sunk investments. Telecommunications networks, for example, were identified as key drivers of economic growth (Röller and Waverman 2001; Czernich et al. 2011) . For this reason the United States and the European Union have set out ambitious goals to stimulate broadband investment. In the EU, for example, the Agenda 2020 demands that every household in the EU should be covered by a broadband connection offering at least 30 Mbit/s yield structurally identical scenarios for the firms' retail competition in the second stage, because the firms bear no marginal costs on owned infrastructure and thus the scenarios only differ with respect to the sunk investment costs, which should not be relevant for the competitive intensity in the retail market.
Nevertheless, the main finding of our experiment is that the level of tacit collusion is significantly higher in scenarios with co-investment than in scenarios with duplication. Moreover, tacit collusion becomes stronger the more co-investment has occurred. Overall, our empirical results therefore confirm the concern that co-investment may significantly facilitate tacit collusion and thus, the prospects of co-investments on consumers' welfare may not be as positive as suggested in the theoretical literature.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section discusses related literature and thereafter, in Section 3, we present the network competition game, which builds the theoretical foundation for the subsequent experimental analysis. Section 4 describes the design, Section 5 the procedure and Section 6 the results of the experiment. Finally, we conclude by summarizing and discussing the implications of our findings in Section 7.
Related Literature
The relationship between regulation and investment has attracted a large literature, which is reviewed in general by Guthrie (2006) and with respect to broadband infrastructure by Cambini and Jiang (2009) and Briglauer et al. (2014) . More specifically, the few theoretical contributions with respect to co-investments in broadband markets are reviewed by Bourreau et al. (2012: pp. 404-405) .
In particular, Wiethaus (2010, 2011 ) compare co-investments (which they call "risk-sharing") with long-run incremental cost pricing, fully distributed cost pricing and regulatory holidays. They find that co-investment regulation yields the highest consumers' surplus because it provides a balance between investment incentives and competitive intensity. In particular, Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011: p. 264 ) find that for any given investment level, co-investment "is expected to induce the highest competitive intensity in the product market." This stands in sharp contrast to our empirical results. Similar theoretical results as Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) are obtained by Silvestri (2012, 2013) who also show that risk-sharing emerges as the most favorable regime with respect to consumers' surplus for a large range of parameters. Bourreau et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis of co-investments which shows that co-investment will only increase total coverage if firms experience considerable cost savings (e.g. due to lower financing costs) or a demand expansion effect due to co-investment. However, none of these theoretical papers takes the possibility of tacit collusion into account.
From an empirical and theoretical point of view, the relationship between cooperation upstream and collusion downstream has been considered in the context of R&D joint ventures. From a theoretical perspective joint ventures can create new means for punishment (see, e.g. Cabral 2000) or signaling (Cooper and Ross 2009) , and can reduce cost asymmetries (Miyagiwa 2009 ), which may all facilitate tacit collusion. Indeed, Duso et al. (2014) show empirically that firms' market share is lowered after joining an research joint venture, which they take as evidence for collusion at the retail level.
From a methodological point of view, our paper relates to the literature on experimental industrial organization. The use of laboratory experiments for policy evaluation has been advocated by Plott (1987) and in the review by Normann and Ricciuti (2009) among others. In particular, the circumstances under which tacit collusion in oligopolies may arise have been extensively studied in experimental economics. Potters and Suetens (2013) and Engel (2007) provide a comprehensive survey and meta-analysis.
In this context, it is important to highlight that experimental insights are always derived ceteris paribus, i.e. not the absolute level of tacit collusion in any given treatment matters, but only how the levels of tacit collusion compare across treatments. Thus, it is not surprising that tacit collusion (i.e. a deviation from equilibrium prices) is found per se (which is frequently the case, even in the context of finitely repeated games), but rather that certain market environments lead to more or less tacit collusion.
The most relevant insights from this literature for our experimental set-up are that tacit collusion is mitigated (i) in the presence of asymmetry between firms (see, e.g. Mason et al. 1992) , (ii) when no (cheap-talk) communication between firms is possible (see, e.g. Fonseca and Normann 2012) , (iii) when the number of firms increases (see, e.g. Huck et al. 2004), (iv) in the presence of Cournot instead of Bertrand competition (see, e.g. Suetens and Potters 2007), and (v) in the presence of uniform pricing constraints across areas (Horstmann and Krämer 2013) .
In our experiment, we impose asymmetry, a restriction of communication and a uniform pricing constraint, which should all mitigate the emergence of tacit collusion. However, for reasons of external validity we also consider a duopoly market and Bertrand competition, which could facilitate tacit collusion.
Finally, we point out that several previous experimental studies have investigated related scenarios in which cooperation on one stage facilitated collusion on another stage, e.g. collusive advertising on tacit price collusion (Nicklisch 2012) , buyer groups on collusion in the product market (Normann et al. 2015) and, as discussed above, R&D cooperation on price collusion (Suetens 2008) .
The Network Competition Game
Our experiments are based on the following "network competition game," which captures the essential features of competition between two firms (i, j ∈ {1, 2}) in a network industry, e.g. the telecommunications industry. It is assumed that firms compete in offering a new service (e.g. fiber-to-the-home) to the same end customers or households. However, before firms can do so, they first have to invest in new network infrastructure.
Structure, Treatments and Payoffs
The game consists of two subsequent phases: First, in the investment phase the firms must decide on their coverage area. During this phase co-investment may be possible or not. Moreover, during the investment stage both firms have complete knowledge about their regulatory environment. In particular, they know exactly how the regulator will determine the access price based on their investment decision, which will be detailed below. Second, in the retail phase firms compete in prices when offering their new service to covered households. The game proceeds in discrete time steps, denoted by t. The details and timing of each phase are described in the following.
Investment Phase (t = 0)
In this phase the two firms must decide on their coverage, i.e. which areas they would like to connect to their network. We assume that households are located in three distinct regional areas (e.g. metropolitan, urban and rural areas) with n I > n II > n III households, respectively.
For the case that a firm builds infrastructure in a given area we assume for simplicity that all households in that area are being connected to the network, although not all of them necessarily subscribe to that network. This characterization roughly holds true for fiber-to-the-home access networks (see, Hoernig et al. 2012) .
The set of areas in which firm i owns infrastructure is called i's coverage and denoted by N i . The total area covered by the industry is therefore N ̅ = N 1 ∪ N 2 . Similarly, the number of households that are connected (but not necessarily subscribers) to i's network are called i's customer base and denoted by . 
Regulatory treatments.
In the investment phase, we differentiate between two regulatory treatments: -Co-investment not allowed: Absent the possibility to co-invest, the firms decide sequentially on their coverage area and each firm has to bear the full infrastructure investment costs on its own: For reasons of external validity and to facilitate coordination of investments, we assume that the incumbent, say firm 1, may choose its coverage first. Subsequently and observing the choice of firm 1, firm 2, called the entrant, can choose its coverage. -Co-investment allowed: If co-investments are allowed, a co-investment phase is added at the beginning of the game. This means that the two firms can make a binding contract on which areas they will cover with joint infrastructure, prior to deciding on their independent infrastructure investments sequentially.
In summary, in each of the three areas exactly one of the following four investment scenarios may occur: (i) co-investment by both firms, if co-investment was allowed, (ii) duplication, i.e. independent investments by both firms, (iii) investment by exactly one firm, or (iv) no investment.
Investment costs. Let a firm's full stand-alone infrastructure investment cost for each area be k. Notice that by the economics of density it is therefore more costly to connect a rural household to the network infrastructure than it is to connect a household in a more densely populated area. As will be seen later in the theoretical analysis, firms will base their decisions on the average connection costs per household. Therefore, the normalization that the full investment cost in each area is k is without loss of generality. Let 
where each firm bears the full investment costs in the number of areas that it covers alone ( only i N and duplicated i N ), and, a share of α i < 1 of the full investment costs in the number of areas in which it co-invested.
Retail Phase (t = 1, ..., T)
Subsequent to the investment phase, at time t = 1, …, T, the two firms compete in the retail market for households/customers. Access regulation. We stipulate that access regulation is in effect whenever one firm monopolizes the network infrastructure in an area. Hence, firm i has to grant firm j access in areas only , i N such that firm j can also provide its service to the n̅ -n j households that it does not cover with own infrastructure. According to the current regulatory practice in the telecommunications industry, the access charge which firm j has to pay to firm i for using its infrastructure in those areas is regulated and calculated according to the long-run incremental costs, which are described in more detail later.
Demand. More specifically, we assume that firms offer a homogeneous service and compete in prices. Households have a uniform willingness to pay of v for the service of either firm and will exclusively subscribe to the service of the firm that offers the lower price (Bertrand competition). In the case where the retail prices of the two firms are equal, the incumbent's service is assumed to be more attractive to the households than the entrant's service. This is done for reasons of external validity and to mitigate tacit collusion by imposing asymmetry between the firms. More formally, if the prices of both firms are identical, the households will choose the incumbent's service with probability 0.5 ≤ δ 1 < 1 and the entrant's service with probability δ 2 = 1 - δ 1 .
Moreover, we assume that there exists a regulatory requirement for the firms to provide their service in the industry's whole coverage area or not at all (must-serve obligation 1 ) and to set a uniform price 2 for all households across geographic areas. Must-serve obligations are common in network industries (Hoernig 2006) and the uniform pricing constraint should also mitigate tacit collusion ( Horstmann and Krämer 2013) . These requirements also hold for the non-investing firm.
In summary, this means that in each period t = 1, …, T, each firm i simultaneously and independently specifies a single retail price p i,t for its service. Access 1 In reality, must-serve obligations are only imposed on incumbents. Requiring them for noninvesting firms serves as a simplification in order to reduce complexity for the participants in the experiments. The must-serve obligation refers only to those households that live in an area that has been covered/connected in the first stage of the game. While the must-serve assumption most probably is not uncritical with respect to the market dynamics, any firm has the option to set a price above the consumers' willingness to pay of v, which effectively means that it will never receive any demand and thus it does not serve the market. 2 For broadband, uniform retail pricing is imposed in no place that we know of. In practice firms often use it voluntarily, though. The alternative to uniform pricing would have been that firms can set an individual price in each area. This would significantly increase the complexity of the game and would make it much more difficult trying to assess collusion. regulation in combination with the must-serve obligation imply that the firm that has the lower price will receive the full market demand n̅ , whereas the firm with the higher price receives no direct demand at all. In other words the demand function is: if and ( , ) i f and
Marginal costs and access charge. The marginal costs for serving households over own infrastructure, also in the case of co-investment, are w.l.o.g. set to zero. This assumption is in line with the theoretical models of Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) and Bourreau et al. (2013) . However, if the service is provided over foreign infrastructure, firms have to bear marginal costs in the form of the regulated access charge a, which is paid per period and household. In line with the widespread regulatory practice a is computed according to the long-run incremental costs (LRIC), which depend on the firms' investment decisions. More specifically, the LRIC access charge that firm i would have to pay j ≠ i (per period and household that it serves over j's infrastructure) is:
The access charge is therefore equal to the total investment of the firm providing access divided by number of households connected to that network times the number of periods. 3 In addition, the LRIC include a return on investment of γ ≥ 1. In other words, γ - 1 is the assumed interest rate on capital. 4 Consequently, firm i's average marginal costs are
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Profits/payoffs. In each period t > 0, firm i's operating profit, Π i,t , is thus given by the sum of its retail profit,
, and its wholesale profit from the provision of access to its competitor,
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Thus, at the end of period T, firm i receives the sum of its profits from periods t = 1, …, T, reduced by the infrastructure investment costs from period t = 0. The final profit of firm i is therefore:
Theoretical Prediction
While we relegate all the details of the derivation of the Nash equilibrium of the above network competition game to the appendix, we now sketch the main properties of this equilibrium. Let p t denote the market price in period t. Then the unique price Nash equilibrium of any Bertrand stage game (neglecting increments) in the retail phase t = 1, …, T is given by
where · returns the smallest feasible price level that is larger than its argument. Further, under reasonable assumptions about the equilibrium concept of the finitely repeated Bertrand stage game (e.g. subgame perfectness), the above unique equilibrium of the Bertrand stage game is also the unique equilibrium of the whole, repeated Bertrand game, i.e.
( , , , , ).
t T p p p p * * * * = … … The reason why firms consider the sum of their average marginal costs instead of the maximum average marginal cost (as would be the case in a standard Bertrand game) is the following: A firm's average marginal costs represent the access charge (wholesale profit) that the competitor receives on average for each household that is served by that firm. Thus, the other firm's marginal costs are one's own opportunity costs and therefore the sum of the firms' average marginal costs constitutes a lower bound on prices. This is in line with the literature on the costs of inputs sold to bottleneck competitors (see, DeGraba 2003, where homogeneous goods imply a diversion ratio of one). In our case it is as if the access provider were vertically separated into an upstream network owner and a downstream retail company that has to buy access from its own network company just like a competitor who does not own an upstream network. At the same time, by the usual logic of Bertrand competition, the equilibrium price cannot exceed the sum of the firms' average marginal costs plus one price increment.
Before proceeding to the investment equilibrium, it is important to highlight two things. First, we are particularly interested in the retail price equilibrium, given an investment decision in the first stage. In particular, see that co-investment and duplication have an identical effect on the average marginal costs, because in both cases the access charge in the co-invested or duplicated area is zero. Thus, we should expect similar prices whenever we observe similar levels of co-investment and duplication in any given market.
Second, instead of comparing the competitive intensity while exogenously controlling for different investment scenarios, we have opted to let the firms decide the investment scenarios endogenously in the first stage of the game. This has been done for reasons of external validity as well as the fact that the process of reaching a joint investment decision may already have ramifications for the competitive intensity. Of course, investment decisions will also be based on the expectation about future prices, which may systematically deviate from the equilibrium prices, particularly if tacit collusion is suspected. The equilibrium investment analysis, which assumes that firms expect equilibrium prices, is therefore necessarily wrong if the individual expectations are different. Thus, we will not focus on investment decisions when presenting our empirical results, but we will condition our theoretical prediction of the retail phase on the observed investment scenario. For what follows, it is therefore sufficient to consider the retail price equilibrium denoted in (7). 
Experimental Design
The design of the experiment followed exactly the Network Competition Game described in the previous section. That is, participants were randomly assigned a role as incumbent or entrant, then had to invest in (common) network infrastructure and finally competed for customers in the retail phase. We consider three different treatments.
Co (co-investment allowed; communication about investment allowed): In this treatment firms are first allowed to co-invest. 6 Thereafter, firms decide sequentially and independently on their coverage area and each firm has to bear the full infrastructure investment costs on its own. During the co-investment phase communication between the two firms about investments is allowed in order to facilitate coordination on common coverage areas. However, communication about prices is strictly prohibited.
7 In this way a so-called Chinese wall approach is implemented, which mimics the corresponding regulatory remedy that has been suggested in the context of co-investments. While it is obviously infeasible that firms engage in co-investments without prior communication of the investment departments of the respective firms, the Chinese wall regulation demands that at least the retail departments are not allowed to communicate. In this vein, the possibility for price collusion is deemed to be limited (Fonseca and Normann 2012) .
NoCoC (co-investment not allowed; communication about investment allowed): This treatment is identical to the Co treatment, but co-investments are not allowed. However, firms may still communicate prior to investment and the same Chinese walls restrictions on price communication as in the co-investment treatment apply.
NoCo (co-investment not allowed; no communication allowed): This treatment is identical to the NoCoC treatment, but communication is not possible. Hence this treatment serves as a benchmark were neither co-investment nor communication is allowed.
It is important to highlight that the Co treatment merely allows the firms to co-invest, but does not require co-investment. Thus, by means of the NoCoC treatment we can control for the impact of the mere possibility to co-invest. If firms did not co-invest Co and NoCoC are ex-post identical. Table 1 shows the parameter values of the Network Competition Game that were adopted for the experiment. Notice that the total demand is shared 75/25 in favor of the incumbent at equal prices, and thus also in equilibrium. This has 6 The co-investment decision was implemented in such a way that both firms had to select independently and simultaneously in which area they wanted to co-invest. Firms were notified if their selection did not match the selection of the other firm, and firms could only confirm their decision when both firms had selected the same set of areas for co-investment. Only when both firms confirmed their concurring co-investment decisions, the game proceeded to the next stage. 7 Communication was text-based and monitored in real time during the experiment to ensure compliance. Moreover, a perfect stranger matching procedure was adopted which implied that participants were also not allowed to reveal their identity and that they knew the probability of being re-matched with the same participant was exactly zero.
been done in order to create an asymmetry between the firms, which should hinder tacit collusion. This demand share is also reflected in the share of individual costs under co-investments. Here the incumbent (entrant) has to bear 75% (25%) of the total costs. Otherwise the entrant would be put at a disadvantage and possibly refrain from co-investments for this reason alone.
In the experiment, participants were endowed with an initial budget of 18M experimental currency units (ECU) in order to be able to cover the expenses of network infrastructure investments in all three areas. The remaining budget was added to a participant's profits in the network competition game and paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. Thereby, 1M ECU was converted to 1 EUR.
Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany in November 2011, computerized and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) , and participants were students of economic fields that were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004) . The experimental instructions [see Appendix C in Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) ] were handed out and read aloud to the participants. Subsequently, comprehension was tested through an on screen questionnaire. Participants could only participate in the experiment after having correctly answered all questions. In order to reduce complexity for the participants, during the experiment participants were equipped with a calculator and provided with 
Parameter description Value
Number of households in each area n I = 40,000 n II = 20,000 n III = 10,000 Development costs per area k = 6,000,000 Cost share (for co-investments) information on LRICs as well as demand and profit forecasts, given their expectation of prices.
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All treatments were run in sessions with two independent cohorts. There were four cohorts, consisting of six participants each, for each of the three treatment conditions, i.e. 72 participants in total. Each participant was exclusively assigned to one treatment condition (between subject design) and played five rounds of the network competition game with a different partner in each round. Only subjects that belonged to the same cohort interacted with each other. Participants did not know who was assigned to which cohort within one session. This ensures that anonymity was not compromised during the experiment. In the course of the five rounds every one of the six participants was matched to every other participant in the same cohort exactly once in random order and the possibility to be re-matched to the same partner was zero. The participants knew that they would never play another round with the same partner firm and hence, this matching procedure should mitigate tacit collusion.
In each round the assignment of incumbent and entrant was randomly chosen and participants were aware of this fact. As described before, each round consisted of one investment decision and 10 retail periods. During a round, the partner matching remained fixed.
In each round the previous account balance was cleared and participants were endowed with the initial budget anew. The earnings (firm profit plus remaining initial budget) of only one round were paid out at the end of the experiment in order to create monetary independence between the rounds. The first round was declared as a practice round. Thus it was not relevant for the final pay off and is also not considered in the subsequent analysis. At the end of the experiment participants threw a four-sided dice in order to determine which of the remaining four rounds was paid out to them. Sessions lasted about 2 hours and subjects' average monetary earning was 20.55 EUR.
Results
In total, we obtained 48 duopoly observations (12 concurrent duopolies over four rounds) for each of the three treatment conditions. No investment in network infrastructure occurred once in the Co treatment and three times in the NoCo treatment. These observations were omitted from further analysis, which yields a total of 140 duopoly observations in the final sample. Consequently, at the level of individual firms, we obtain 280 observations, i.e. a total of 2800 prices.
Recall that the purpose of the treatments is to create some external variation in the investment scenarios (by allowing either communication, or co-investment, or both) in order to study their impact on tacit collusion. A treatment by treatment comparison is not very meaningful, because, on the one hand, investment scenarios within a treatment may differ considerably (e.g. co-investment may or may not occur in Co), 9 but on the other hand, investment scenarios across treatments may be identical (e.g. between Co and NoCoC when no co-investment has occurred).
10 Nevertheless, it is useful to identify the extent to which external variation of the investment scenarios was created by the treatments and to this end Table 2 provides an overview. Network coverage is measured by the number of areas connected (area), and the number of ten thousand households connected (10K HH).
As we are particularly interested in the comparison of investment scenarios with co-investment and duplication with respect to tacit collusion, Table 2 reports not only the total coverage, but also in how many duopolies co-investment and duplication have occurred and the extent of co-investment and duplication when they occurred. Moreover, Table 3 reveals that the external variation through treatments was successful in the sense that co-investment and duplication occur roughly equally often across treatments, but almost never jointly in any given duopoly. This enables us to separate the effect of co-investment and duplication on tacit collusion, and to compare both investment scenarios to the level of tacit collusion when neither duplication, nor co-investment has occurred.
Tacit Collusion
In the following, we investigate differences in tacit collusion across different investment scenarios. Tacit collusion is measured in two alternative ways. First tacit collusion is assessed by the deviation of the market price (i.e. firms' lowest price) from the Nash equilibrium price (i.e. sum of marginal costs), which we will abbreviate by ΔEQ in the following. This corresponds to the standard notion of tacit collusion usually reported in the empirical literature (see, e.g. Engel 2007; Boone 2008; Potters and Suetens 2013) . When firms play the Nash price equilibrium following any given investment scenario, then ΔEQ = 0. However, due to the presence of fixed investment costs, the firms would inevitably suffer a loss at this price, which is typical for network industries. Thus, we also explore a second, alternative measure of tacit collusion that is based on a firm's deviation of its own price from its own average costs (AC), which we will abbreviate by ΔAC in the following. At ΔAC = 0 a firm sets the lowest price that would allow it to break even. Arguably ΔAC is the more conservative measure of tacit collusion, and we will consider both measures in our subsequent analysis. Moreover, it is important Only in two duopolies co-investment and duplication occurred jointly.
to note that ΔEQ is derived using only the price of the firm that currently sets the market price, whereas ΔAC is derived for each firm, irrespective of whether it currently sets the market price. Thus, we obtain twice as many observations for ΔAC as for ΔEQ. Table 4 provides the summary statistics on market prices (averaged over all then periods) and the extent of tacit collusion for the different investment scenarios. Figure 1 gives a first indication of the levels of tacit collusion over time in the respective investment scenarios, using both collusion measures. In all cases we find some degree of tacit collusion, which is in line with previous experimental evidence (Engel 2007; Potters and Suetens 2013) . When tacit collusion is measured relative to the Nash equilibrium, we observe that duplication and co-investment yield higher degrees of tacit collusion than in the case when neither duplication nor co-investment has occurred. This was to be expected as both co-investment and duplication imply low average marginal costs in the sense of equation (4) above, which drives the Nash equilibrium down, but does not allow the firms to recoup their investments. By contrast, when firms do not co-invest or duplicate, LRIC-based access regulation is in effect, which constitutes positive marginal costs that would allow the access-provider to recover its costs (plus ROI). However, we also observe that the degree of tacit collusion is substantially higher when co-investment has occurred than when duplication has occurred. As explained above, this cannot be rationalized from a theoretical point of view. Tacit collusion is measured by the deviation of the market price (i.e. firms' lowest price) from the Nash equilibrium price (ΔEQ), and the deviation of each firm's own price from its own average costs (ΔAC).
Likewise, when tacit collusion is measured by the deviation from average costs, which controls for the (sunk) investment costs, we can also observe that co-investments lead to higher levels of tacit collusion: Whereas firms tend to be more competitive when they have duplicated infrastructure relative to the benchmark of access regulation (i.e. neither co-investment nor duplication), they tend to be less competitive when they have co-invested in infrastructure.
These graphical insights derived can be substantiated by the OLS regression analyses in Table 5 . In the regressions, we control for the degree of co-investment and duplication (measured in co-invested or duplicated households 11 ), the total coverage, the investment round and whether communication about investments was possible or not. In addition, instead of using tacit collusion (based on the deviation of prices from equilibrium prices and average costs) directly as the dependent variable in OLS regression models (1) and (2), respectively, we also 11 See Appendix B in Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) , where the same set of regressions is also considered with coverage measured by the number of areas covered. This yields qualitatively the same results. regress the market price and own price on the same set of covariates plus the respective benchmark (equilibrium price or average costs) in models (3) and (4), respectively.
Furthermore, note that due to our random stranger matching scheme, observations from a single cohort of six players are not statistically independent. In the OLS regression analyses, we therefore cluster standard errors at the level of independent cohorts to model the statistical dependence between the observations. The regressions in Table 5 confirm that co-investment leads to significantly higher levels of tacit collusion and prices than duplication, everything else being equal: In model 1, both duplication and co-investment show a statistically significant positive effect on the price deviation from the equilibrium, but the effect of co-investment is significantly stronger (Wald test, z = 8.43, p = 0.014) . In model 2, the impact of co-investment on the own price deviation from average costs is statistically significant and positive, while the impact of duplication is significant and negative. In model 3, relative to a low baseline price (see constant in model 3), co-investment leads to significantly higher market prices, while duplication does not significantly affect prices. Similarly, in model 4 relative to a high baseline price (see constant in model 4), duplication leads to significantly lower prices, while co-investment does not significantly affect prices.
Moreover, all four models show that tacit collusion and prices increase significantly with total coverage. Thus, as the market size increases and the stakes for market participants become higher, tacit collusion seems to be easier to sustain.
Furthermore, the regressions show that the implemented Chinese-Wall restriction on communication was successful. If communication about prices would have been possible, it should be expected that communication leads to an increase in tacit collusion (Fonseca and Normann 2012) . However, in our experimental design firms were only allowed to communicate about investments, but not about prices. Per se, this type of communication is not suspected to lead to an increase in tacit collusion, and correspondingly, we do not find a significant effect of communication in any of the four regression models. Although communication took place prior to any co-investment project, recall that we can separate the effect of co-investment from communication due to the external variation created by the NoCoC treatment in which communication was possible, but not co-investment. Therefore, we can conclude that, above and beyond communication, the pursuit of the actual co-investment project must have created a virtual bond between the firms, which allowed them to sustain tacit collusion better than absent such a joint project. Moreover, although the Chinese-Wall approach was applied successfully in the experiment, it may be hard to sustain in reality, which makes the emergence of tacit collusion after co-investments even more likely in practice.
Finally, the regressions show that the extent of tacit collusion tends to increase across the four investment rounds. That is, although the participants were randomly rematched with a different partner in each round, they were able to learn to tacitly collude over the course of the experiment. Note that this is not a particular effect of the co-investment scenario (i.e. there is no significant interaction effect between co-investment and round), but generally holds for all scenarios [see Appendix B.1 in Krämer and Vogelsang (2016)] .
However, at the same time, prices within one round tend to decline and approach the theoretical prediction over time, particularly towards the last periods (see Figure 1 above and the panel regressions in Table B .1 in the Appendix.) This end game effect, where tacit collusion breaks down towards the end of a repeated game with finite time horizon is well known in the experimental literature. The fact that prices approach the theoretical benchmark towards the end shows that participants are generally well aware of the best-response strategy which would ultimately lead to an equilibrium outcome.
In this context, note that we find no empirical evidence for the fact that tacit collusion, particularly in the context of co-investment, is only due to erroneous behavior in the early periods or rounds of the game. Figures B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix of Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) show that all four rounds show a similar pattern of prices (first high, then declining). Thus, it cannot be argued that participants learned that they made a "mistake" by playing off the equilibrium path, as prices in the next round are not lower than where they were in the previous round. In fact, as shown above, the opposite is true, and participants rather learn that tacit collusion allows them to reap higher profits. Furthermore, these figures also show that the same ranking of prices across the three investment scenarios prevails over the course of the experiment. Thus, it cannot be argued that the increased level of tacit collusion under co-investment is only due to erroneous behavior in early rounds. In line with this argumentation, we also do not find a significant interaction effect between round and period on tacit collusion or prices (see Table B .1 in the Appendix).
Evidently, our finding that co-investment leads to higher levels of tacit collusion has a detrimental effect on the assessment of consumer welfare under a co-investment regime. This stands in contrasts to the findings of Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011 ) and Cambini and Silvestri (2012 , who ascertain a positive effect of co-investment on consumers' surplus in their theoretical analysis in which they neglect tacit collusion. However, we cannot rule out that co-investments may still be overall improving upon consumers' (or total) welfare in comparison to other regulatory regimes. This is because our experiment cannot offer conclusive evidence on the effect of co-investment on total coverage, since we did not model the full complexity of the firms' investment decisions in order to focus on the effect of tacit collusion.
In our experiment, we did not find a significant increase of total coverage due to (the possibility to) co-investment [see Appendix B.2 and B.3 in Krämer and Vogelsang (2016) ]. However, in reality firms may find it easier to finance co-investment projects, because they need less capital than in the case of independent investments and because the investment risk is shared (Nitsche and Wiethaus 2011; Silvestri 2012, 2013 . It has also been noted that coinvestment may lead to a market expansion effect (Bourreau et al. 2013) , which may also increase coverage under co-investment. In fact, Bourreau et al. (2013) show that co-investment may only increase coverage if either there is a demand expansion effect or cost savings due to the reduction in uncertainty is high. In any case, these effects are not considered here. However, neither of these effects should affect the emergence of tacit collusion once investment has taken place, and thus, they should not affect our main insight that tacit collusion is higher under co-investment ceteris paribus.
Conclusions
In this paper we considered the relationship between co-investment (i.e. cooperation at the infrastructure level) and tacit collusion (i.e. cooperation at the retail level) by means of an economic laboratory experiment.
Our main finding is that co-investment indeed facilitates tacit collusion with respect to both, an equilibrium (marginal costs) benchmark, as well as an average costs benchmark. This is particularly immanent when comparing investment scenarios in which co-investment occurred to investment scenarios in which infrastructure duplication occurred. From a theoretical point of view the competitive situation in the retail market is identical in both scenarios, because in both cases the competitors can use the network infrastructure at zero marginal costs. The only difference lies in the size of the sunk investment costs, which are larger for each firm in the case of duplication. However, we find that prices and the degree of tacit collusion are actually significantly lower in the case of duplication than in the case of co-investment, everything else being equal. This means that competition on the basis of co-investment may not be considered as akin to actual infrastructure-based competition on the basis of duplication.
Although the possibility that co-investments may facilitate tacit collusion has been noted by regulatory authorities (see, e.g. BEREC 2012), our empirical results offer the first conclusive evidence in this regard. Consequently, our results raise skepticism about the welfare conclusions on co-investments that are derived in the extant theoretical papers (Nitsche and Wiethaus 2011; Silvestri 2012, 2013) that neglect this negative effect on consumers' welfare.
However, it must be noted that our analysis takes mostly a static view, by considering tacit collusion given investment decisions. Therefore, even in the presence of increased tacit collusion, co-investment may still be overall improving upon consumers' welfare when it actually leads to more investments than if no co-investments were allowed. Nevertheless, our results indicate that the threat of tacit collusion under co-investment is real and therefore regulatory authorities should carefully evaluate and supervise co-investments, particularly with respect to effective competition in the retail market.
The following are some limitations of our study and avenues for future work. First, although several design choices should generally mitigate the emergence of tacit collusion (asymmetric payoffs, random stranger re-matching, Chinese walls), still other factors not considered here may drive price collusion. For example, tacit collusion may be harder to sustain with more firms (Huck et al. 2004 ). However, a co-investment consortium of more than two firms may also be much harder to establish, which could limit the extent of co-investment considerably in the first place. This trade off may be considered in more detail by future work. Second, we have made the simplifying assumption that firms must set the same retail price in all coverage areas. To date, this assumption seems to be empirically justified for Europe, where network operators rarely differentiate prices for identical access products between different regions (Hoernig 2006) . Moreover experimental evidence by Horstmann and Krämer (2013) suggests that a uniform pricing constraint renders markets more competitive than if price discrimination across regions is allowed. Thus, it is unlikely that price discrimination will reduce the level of tacit collusion and that it would only affect the co-investment scenario. Nevertheless, in the context of regionally differentiated regulation, price discrimination may emerge and it would then be interesting to investigate which effect the required price uniformity across regions has on investments and collusion. This would also take care of the must-serve obligation.
it can be shown that (7) would lose all demand for its retail product and receive payoffs from wholesale access only, such that its profit is have to bear more than 50% of the investment cost of a monopoly firm due to some individual fixed costs, wheras each firm receives less than 50% of the monopoly profit due to the emergence of competition. Thus, co-investment does not emerge in equilibrium unless there exist some additional effects, which we do not model here, like an additional demand expansion effect due to co-investment or an actual cost reduction effect, e.g. due to lower financing costs (Bourreau et al. 2013 ).
B Panel Analysis of Tacit Collusion
In addition to the OLS regression reported in Table 5 , we also consider the following three-level mixed effects model, which accepts measurements at the level + p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. The regression confirms the results of the OLS regression in Table 5 and additionally shows that tacit collusion decreases over the periods in a given round. However, there is no significant interaction effect between periods and rounds. Here, price tds denotes the (deviation of the) price (from the equilibrium price or average costs) in period t for duopoly d in the independent subgroup s. ζ s and β s are random effects that are common to observations from the same subgroup s. ζ ds as well as β ds are random effects common to the measurements from the same duopoly d, nested in subgroup s.
